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This article aims to show that fundamentality is construed differently in the 
two most prominent strategies of analysis we find in physical science and 
engineering today: (1) atomistic, reductive analysis and (2) Systems analysis. 
Correspondingly, atomism is the conception according to which the simplest 
(smallest) indivisible entity of a certain kind is most fundamental; while systemism, 
as will be articulated here, is the conception according to which the bonds that 
structure wholes are most fundamental, and scale and/or constituting entities 
are of no significance whatsoever for fundamentality. Accordingly, atomists 
maintain that the basic entities—the atoms—are fundamental, and together 
with the “external” interactions among them, are sufficient for illuminating all 
the features and behaviors of the wholes they constitute; whereas systemists 
proclaim that it is instead structural qualities of systems, that flow from internal 
relations among their constituents and translate directly into behaviors, that 
are fundamental, and by themselves largely (if not entirely) sufficient for 
illuminating the features and behaviors of the wholes thereby structured.
Systemism, as will be argued, is consistent with the nonexistence of a 
fundamental “level” of nondecomposable entities, just as it is consistent with 
the existence of such a level. Still, systemism is a conception of the fundamental 
in quite different, but still ontological terms. Systemism can serve the special 
sciences—the social sciences especially—better than the conception of 
fundamentality in terms of atoms. Systemism is, in fact, a conception of 
fundamentality that has rather different uses—and importantly, different 
resonances. This conception of fundamentality makes contact with questions 
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pertaining to natural kinds and their situation in the metaphysics of the special 
sciences—their situation within an order of autonomous sciences.
The controversy over fundamentality is evident in the social sciences too, 
albeit somewhat imperfectly, in the terms of debate between methodological 
individualists and functionalists/holists. This article will thus clarify the difference 
between systemism and holism.
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A Building-Block Conception of Fundamentality 
in the Assumptions of Atomism
I assume . . . that matter is ultimately particulate. I assume that every 
material thing is composed of things that have no proper parts: “elemen-
tary particles” or “mereological atoms” or “metaphysical simples.”
—Peter van Inwagen (1990, 5)
When physicists speak of the fundamental, they are expressing a reduc-
tionist ideology—it is an occupational hazard with them—to the effect that a 
certain primacy belongs to the smallest “independent” building blocks of the 
universe, as well as to the laws that govern these fundamentals in relation to 
one another on their own scale. A theory that treats comprehensively of these 
fundamentals will be, as they say in physics, a theory of everything (TOE).1 
What’s more, it is now very well known that formulations willy-nilly of the 
TOE is likely, if we are not very careful, to eventuate in more structure, for 
example in more space-time structure, than is absolutely required. It might, 
for instance, ascribe metric structure to our space-time in addition to mere 
symplectic structure; and this is more structure than is absolutely necessary 
for its purposes (as ably discussed by North [2009]). Or it might, for its 
expository purposes, utilize mathematical or logical structure that is not itself 
a feature of the subject matter—purely abstract structure (Field 1980). So to 
identify the fundamental entities in any purported TOE, an apologist of the 
“building-block” conception of fundamentality will have to examine all 
legitimate reformulations—the allowable variants—to identify what they all 
have in common, rather than simply what any one of them says on its own. 
And this means that, to diagnose the fundamental entities of a TOE, we must 
also display its allowable formulational variants. Thus on the building-block 
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conception of fundamentality, we shall be required to know a great deal, in 
excess of knowing that the purported TOE is true, to ascertain the truly 
fundamental—its ineliminable invariants.
The building-block conception of fundamentality derives from a concep-
tion of the unity of science with roots in conceptual analysis.2 This model of 
unity originated within the Vienna Circle and was endorsed by Rudolf Carnap 
in his Logical Construction of the World (1928). On this conception, the sci-
ences are unified through the unity of their subject matters, which is evident 
in the relations between their concepts. Roughly, scientific terminology makes 
reference to the world, perhaps even to the same regions of it, but different 
sciences make contact with the world at different “scales,” “levels” or “strata.” 
And this fact corresponds to the relations in which stand the conceptual appa-
ratus of different sciences: the concepts of the sciences stand in hierarchy 
relations, corresponding to the hierarchy of the sciences themselves.
Carnap’s own work was characterized by a concern for logical construc-
tions out of basic concepts in axiomatic structures, and rigorous reductive 
logical connections between conceptual categories. This orientation led him to 
a privileging of a “most basic stuff” and a preference for physics as a privi-
leged locus. And this consequently led him to a hierarchy of conceptual 
structures for the sciences. Many construals have emerged since Carnap’s 
time, as to how precisely to make sense of the relations between the conceptual 
apparatus of different sciences. These shall not be primary objects of inquiry here, 
though I shall gesture at the two most aspirant of these today: supervenience-
based models of unity and (with important overlap) emergentistic models. 
Both of them build implicitly on an assumption that there are fundamental 
entities or atoms. I shall use the term atomism to refer to the doctrine that there 
is a ground floor of entities, of building blocks, from and on which all the other 
entities are built, which fundamental building materials (“atoms”) physics 
will—ultimately—describe. The fuss, when once this proposition is accepted, 
will revolve around how to account for the “granularity” of the world—the 
apparently nonatomic realities that “rest layer-like” on the atoms.3
Before proceeding, it is important simply to note that, as Jonathan Schaf-
fer (2003, 505) concludes:
[W]e do not, right now, have any evidence for atomism. We now have 
no evidence that there will be a final theory, no evidence that such a 
theory will postulate anything that could serve as a mereological atom, 
and no evidence that such a theoretical postulate will correspond to an 
ontological atom as opposed to a boringly decomposable composite. 
Evidence for fundamentality is lacking thrice over.
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And so to the extent that there is pervasive confidence in a ground floor of 
entities, that confidence must be construed as rooted in simple faith.
While insistence on a theory of science as unified in Carnapian terms has 
waned, focus on its legacy of levels has only intensified. The effort has been 
focused on the formulation of nonreductive physicalism in a climate of 
antireductionism. In constructing layers, supervenience theorists articulate 
what (following O’Connor and Wong [2009]) I will refer to as structural-
ist relations. These amount to one-way grounding relations—sufficiency 
relations—between sets of facts (physical-to-mental, for instance). Similarly, 
emergentistic formulations of nonreductive physicalism, which utilize the 
notion of supervenience, articulate an “accummulationist” sufficiency rela-
tion between a (putatively large) set of facts and a “new” layer. This is true of 
O’Connor (1994); O’Connor’s work since 2000 has rejected the superve-
nience basis, in favor of a more dynamical account: emergent properties are 
“nonstructural,” for O’Connor (2000), “in that the occurrence of the property 
is not in any sense constituted by the occurrence of more fundamental prop-
erties and relations of the object’s parts.” Similarly Humphreys (1997a, 
1997b) rejects the “structuralism” implicit in supervenience, but—like 
O’Connor (1994, 2000)—retains the notion of levels.
Still, a fundamental theory in the terms just sketched, assuming we had one 
and it were as true as it is earnestly wished-for, is not likely to shed much light 
on (for instance) the lives of biological entities. And so, the building-block 
doctrine of fundamentality deals with ontology in the most narrow sense. It is 
not concerned with metaphysics more broadly construed; not, for instance, 
concerned with the nature of the differences in the layers of order, or the scales 
in which they are manifested, not with their theoretical reliance on one another, 
nor finally with the various autonomies they enjoy. A fundamental theory in 
building-block terms, assuming we had one and it were true, is not yet a theory 
of science in the sense of the Vienna Circle—whatever its merits as a theory 
of entities. It is nowise concerned with the ideas, categories, or theories that 
are key to understanding a domain or phenomenon. Key-hood is (itself) the 
key to epistemological fundamentality. (An important and fascinating ques-
tion is the question of the relationship between ontological and epistemological 
fundamentality—a question that I shall not address here.4) So, to the extent 
that a TOE, if such there should ultimately be, does/will not shed light on the 
nature of, for example, biological phenomena, we shall require some analysis—
presumably in philosophical terms—of the relationship between the entities 
inhabiting the scale of description of the TOE and those residing elsewhere. It 
will have to be a metaphysic.
The reductionistic/physicalistic conception of fundamentality I have just 
sketched is an eligible element of such a metaphysic, happily reliant on the 
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(ultimate) identification of smallest (physical) independents—the simples, as 
such—it is thus a theory of ontological-simplicity-as-ontological-fundamentality. 
According to this theory, simplicity is counterposed to complexity, which is 
often characterized in terms of the interdependence of numerous factors or 
features on one another.
By contrast, disciplines that draw on engineering concepts focus on ine-
liminably interdependent aspects of the world—other features of ontology—to 
characterize and explain important realities operating at higher scales. This 
suggests—and I will indeed defend—the idea that theories reliant on inelim-
inable interdependencies for expository purposes will have a very different 
conception of ontological fundamentality than the now-pervasive conception 
of fundamentality-as-ontological-simplicity.
Simplicity and Its Antithesis
The assumption that there are absolute, noncontext-relative simples—“atoms” 
that are basic independents—is at the heart of one reductionistic orientation. 
I will throughout use the term “atom” in its original sense, as the smallest pos-
sible constituent, the smallest indivisible “part” that anything may possess. 
Specifically, atomism embraces the temptation to treat some one object type 
(or perhaps a small menagerie of types) as inalienably independent. This is a 
commitment that amounts to adoption of an absolute conception of indepen-
dence, as well as an absolute conception of atomhood. Atomism is committed 
to the idea that independence belongs only to the atoms.
Along with this commitment comes another—a commitment to treating 
systematic correlations or coordinations amongst the purportedly indepen-
dent parties (the atoms) as a matter of incidental, “external” or “ecological” 
interactions between them, rather than as systemic and inalienable properties 
of confederations among them.  Atomism thus renders relations between fun-
damentals as external—rather than acceding to the possibility that relations 
may enter internally into the makeup of something that is itself, and despite 
being non-atomic, a fundamental.5
Thus assessment of atomism, to be thoroughgoing, must evaluate the 
entire reductionist package of model-building strategies, which includes: 
(1) independent building-blocks; and (2) no internal relations. Existing 
assessments of atomism have focused almost exclusively on the question of 
building blocks. On such assessments, the refusal of atomism amounts to 
entertaining instead the proposal that every entity has parts, and littler enti-
ties are comprised of littler parts—a proposal that Jonathan Schaffer (2003, 
512-13) refers to as infinite descent, according to which there are no 
indivisibles:
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What would a metaphysic of infinite descent look like? The most strik-
ing feature of an infinite descent is that no level is special. Infinite 
descent yields an egalitarian ontological attitude which is at home in the 
macrophysical world precisely because everything is macro. Mesons, 
molecules, minds, and mountains are in every sense ontologically 
equal. Because there can be no privileged locus for the causal powers, 
and because they must be somewhere, they are everywhere. So infinite 
descent yields an egalitarian metaphysic which dignifies and empowers 
the whole of nature.
On this teaching, science—physics, its successors or offshoots—will continue 
to discover and identify entities on increasingly smaller scales, as further 
decomposables. And there will be no end in sight to these discoveries.
But a refusal to rule out internal relations (in other words, a refusal to accept 
the “no internal relations” plank of atomism) leads to a different conception of 
fundamentality, whether or not one adheres to the notion of building blocks, 
and so it is independent of the question of infinite descent. This article is 
devoted to fleshing out this second conception of fundamentality—systemism, 
as I shall be referring to it.
The antithesis of “no internal relations” involves adoption instead, as the 
fundamental unit of analysis, of the notions of a System rather than the notion 
of an independent entity. This is ultimately where countenancing internal 
relations will lead. What is a System? The notion of a System, with a capital 
S, is what the remainder of this article will be about. Adopting systemism 
will, appropriately, involve adopting a different vision of the relations among 
the sciences—and correspondingly a different theory of science. Importantly, 
this vision of the sciences does not simply solemnify the parody of nonre-
ductivistic metaphysics, however attractive, that radiates from Augustus de 
Morgan’s (1872, 377) lovely little verse:
Great fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite ‘em,
And little fleas have lesser fleas, and so ad infinitum.
And the great fleas themselves, in turn, have greater fleas to go on,
While these again have greater still, and greater still, and so on.
There is something profoundly lacking in this—decidedly antireductionist—
vision of the order of the sciences. For it is simply false that there is biological 
order/organization in the nanosphere. And it is simply true that regimes of 
organization/order/regularity, while not exactly following an order of scale or 
size, are very much constrained by scale. To explain these facts should be a 
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priority of any theory of the sciences. It is worthwhile therefore, in service of 
a theory of science, to focus on the importance of scale, and the extent to 
which disciplines (biological, social, etc., and different, potentially compet-
ing theories within them) span the range of scales, and are constrained by 
scale. These are neglected areas of inquiry.6
The Social Sphere
The pioneers of sociology in the late nineteenth century faced a fundamental-
ity dilemma. The social is the sphere of action, among related things. But 
how shall we conceive of action, its sources, and its authors? On what scale 
or scales does action take place? What sorts of entities can bear the responsi-
bility for action, from a scientific perspective? One way with this question is 
simply to proceed axiomatically—in other words, dogmatically. At the turn 
of the twentieth century, Max Weber founded a school of thought by answering 
the fundamental question of methodology in sociology in an axiomatic way. 
Regarding multi-individual collectivities and institutions he wrote: “in socio-
logical work these collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and 
modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these 
alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable 
action” (Weber 1914, 13). In other words, Weber proposed reserving the term 
“action” for human behavior that proceeds from the machinations of an indi-
vidual human mind that conceptualizes (or, in the language of the school 
Weber would eventually establish, understands) the behavior in question in a 
particular way. This concept of action is, far and away, the most enduring 
legacy of the verstehen school of social science. It issues in what is now 
referred to as methodological individualism, according to which the individ-
ual is to be taken as the one and only unit of agency, because (again according 
to the doctrine) the individual is the one and only unit in which meaning and 
understanding, as rational enterprises, are manifest.
This doctrine is now dominant in the social sciences. Chieftains of the 
methodological individualism tribe routinely assert that theirs is an innocent 
doctrine, devoid of any political or ideological substance. Weber himself cau-
tioned that “it is a tremendous misunderstanding to think that an “individualistic” 
method should involve what is in any conceivable sense an individualistic 
system of values” (Weber 1914, 18). Spokespersons have generally touted it 
as an incontrovertible metaphysical claim, roughly to the effect that the only 
things that exist, when it comes to action, are individuals, and that there is no 
such entity as Society with a capital S, or anything else that comes in units 
larger than a single individual, that can take the stage in the figure of an agent.
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But this is in fact no innocent doctrine. If anyone, anywhere, has ever taken 
action out of a sense of being joined in a cause with others, then the tribal 
pronouncements are simply false. This is decidedly not because there are col-
lective minds or collective consciences. Rather, it is because shared causes 
and collective identities have a way of pooling the action-taking resources of 
the individuals they unify, so that the joint efforts might as well be thought of 
as of a single action-taking entity. For good or ill, the efforts of entities capa-
ble of some cognition, when yoked together in a common cause, are as if they 
were internal to a single such agent again, given the cognitive resources 
enjoyed by so many species, including humans, for working collaboratively. 
There is nothing in the logic of action to prohibit this reality. And so, if one 
takes seriously the notion that the subject matter of sociology is action, one is 
led to consider the possibility of collective action. But the verstehen school 
simply denies this possibility credence.7
It is no innocent doctrine that simply pronounces ex cathedra that only an 
individual (more precisely, an individual human organism) can stand in the 
relation of agent—of author—to some piece of behavior that deserves calling 
an action. The matter concerns the fundaments of agency—the fundamentals 
of it—and it is not one to be settled simply by fiat. For there are alternative 
ways with the question—ways that challenge the very conception of what it is 
for something to be fundamental, with special attention to the social.
How to proceed after acknowledging the possibility of collective agency? 
How to proceed after rejecting the pronouncements of the methodological indi-
vidualism tribe? There are important decisions to make. The first set concerns 
the question: is collective agency itself a single-species category, or an entire 
taxon? One may recognize a whole array of entities deserving the label of 
collective agent, distinguished by their agentic structures. Are these agentic 
structures fundamentally important? If so, how? Another set of decisions 
concerns the question: how are agentic entities identified on the ground? Does 
it take some expertise to identify agents? Are there, for example, agentic struc-
tures of which the individuals on the ground themselves are typically unaware? 
Do environments structure the agentic “terrain” in ways that encourage the 
growth of what we might want to refer to as “implicit agents”? If so, should these 
facts show up explicitly in a taxonomy of agents? The subject is very large, and 
deserving of considerably more attention than can be given here, even by way of 
survey. But we will make a few comments pertaining to our present topic.
A considerable mass of sociological research has sought to examine the 
nature of the bonds that hold groups together—to give an account of the “adhe-
sive” that bonds the various forms of social relations and organizations. From 
the very beginning of the discipline, sociologists have sought to taxonomize 
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social organization, recognizing a great variety in the wild. For instance, the 
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) is best remembered for a 
distinction between two types of social groups parallel to two purportedly 
basic forms of human will: the essential will, which is an organic or instinctive 
driving force; and arbitrary will, which is deliberative and goal-oriented. 
Accordingly Tönnies (1957) referred to associations that form or organize 
around essential will as Gemeinschaft (often translated as community), while 
those in which membership is organized or sustained by some instrumental 
and explicit goal were termed Gesellschaft (often translated as civil society). 
Tönnies held that Gemeinschaft is best or most perfectly exemplified by the 
family and Gesellschaft by the state.8
The Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction is clearly a fellow traveler of 
the more contemporary distinction between individualist and collectivist 
societies. The modern USA lies on one extremum of this continuum—the 
individualist extremum—while east Asian societies (China, Japan, and 
Korea, in particular) fall closer to the other end of the continuum. Younger 
societies, interestingly, with fewer ties to ancient civilizations, gravitate 
toward the individualist end of the scale. Numerous measures are now 
deployed to diagnose societies on the dimension of collectivism, with the 
diagnostic tools being statistical measures applied to aggregations of answers 
to a range of survey questions. Still, R. G. Collingwood’s description (Collin-
gwood 1927, 23) of the collectivist mind is hard to improve on:
The individual counted for nothing except as the member of his guild, 
his church, his monastic order, his feudal hierarchy. Within these insti-
tutions he found a place where he was wanted, work for him to do, a 
market for his wares. He could devote himself to fulfilling the duties 
assigned him by his station in that great organism within which he 
found himself lodged.
The Renaissance, according to Collingwood and others, broke with this 
culture. It gave birth to modern individualism, expressed in “the freedom of 
discovering that one can leave one’s ordained place and march out into the world 
without being struck dead by an offended God” (Collingwood 1927, 30-31).
Collingwood held that individualism is a newcomer, and indeed that the 
individualist quest for freedom led to decoherence of certain activities of 
mind—the aesthetic, religious, scientific modes—that originally cohered 
much more closely. According to Collingwood, God was indeed offended, 
for freedom to leave a social station comes at the price of an internal conflict, 
which is the disease of modernity. The curse of modern individualism is, 
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therefore, the deep cause of the miserable condition—this fragmentation—of 
modern consciousness. Alternatively, one may celebrate the proliferation of 
expertise, intellectual specializations, and disciplines—this multidimensional, 
even baroque, division of labor—both within and without the university. 
Whether this is to be celebrated or lamented, it gives rise to an important 
question, sometimes asked by sociologists: how is specialization related to 
social cohesion? And how is the latter related to collectivism?9
Emile Durkheim had rather a lot of interesting things to say on this topic—
things that counter the methodological individualist’s smug confidence. Long 
before Weber articulated his doctrine, Durkheim argued that in modern soci-
eties, by contrast with traditional ones, the highly complex division of labor 
results in “organic solidarity.” This is a condition in which different special-
izations in employment and social roles create dependencies that tie people to 
one another. In less modern societies, which he referred to as “mechanical 
societies” held together by “mechanical solidarity,” subsistence farmers live 
in communities that are self-sufficient and knit together by a common heri-
tage. Mechanical solidarity thus comes from homogeneity, when people feel 
connected through similar work, educational and religious training, and life-
style. The result of increasing division of labor, according to Durkheim, is 
that individual consciousness (and consequently “individualism”) emerges as 
distinct from collective consciousness—often finding itself in conflict with 
collective consciousness. And so in modern societies, or at least so he pre-
dicted, we should see the dissolution of solidarity (Durkheim 1893).
Durkheim’s analysis is provocative, suggesting the following paradox: to 
the extent that people are tied together by relations of economic dependence, 
to that same extent they experience themselves as individuals distinct from 
others whose concerns and lifeways are not always overlapping; and so to this 
same extent they will experience the Existentialists’ angst over the burden of 
individual responsibility. This is a conundrum well worth dwelling on both 
from a sociological perspective, as well as from a psychological and existen-
tial one. It is a puzzle that repays revisiting from time to time. And coiled 
tightly within it are the seeds of a concern, which we can do little more than 
mention here, that promotion of solidarity works against individual liberty 
and autonomy.
While we can do no more than merely name the concern here, it is worth-
while mentioning that sociologists, like philosophers, are very much interested 
in it. It is, as much as ever, a very open question. The work of many soci-
ologists outside of today’s mainstream—among them members of the 
functionalist schools who were heavily influenced by Durkheim—has sought 
to grapple with this important question. Talcott Parsons and his students 
(Parsons 1991 [1951]; Luhmann 1996) developed a mode of analysis founded 
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on cybernetics (dynamical Systems), which focuses on the notions of func-
tion and integration, to which we shall give further attention below. Not only 
were their methodologies at odds with those of methodological individual-
ism, but it seems that their focus on macro features of social systems gives 
offense of a different sort as well. We shall focus from this point forward on 
the style of analysis that Parsons and those under his influence sought to 
employ, however imperfectly, arguing that it presupposes a different concep-
tion entirely of fundamentality. While it did not originate with them, but 
rather in the work of Norbert Wiener (1948), they embraced it uncritically, 
though perhaps without giving due attention to its presuppositions. This style 
of analysis rejects the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis. Indeed 
it is not concerned with atoms at all. It is instead concerned with behavior and 
dynamics, with stabilities and equilibria, with “inside” versus “outside” and so 
with boundaries between Self and Environment. It is open to the possibility 
of relations—structures, social and otherwise—as potentially inalienable, and 
hence as potentially fundamental.
Systems
A System is not simply a network of independent entities standing in some 
random set of (“external”) relations to one another—at a level superordinate 
to that in which its components are rooted. A System is, rather, a network of 
entities that stand in “nonelective” bonds to one another. These are the inter-
nal relations. What I mean by the term is this: it is not possible to assemble 
the entities in question, as a System, without also the bonds figuring in; it is 
not possible to assemble the entities in question, as a System, with arbitrarily 
chosen bonds. The bonds in question are ineliminable to the confederation of 
these entities, even if some of these entities can confederate, with other enti-
ties, to form a still different sort of System. The relations between the entities 
in question are thus “internal” to their confederation. The bonds are therefore 
also an ineliminable aspect of an apt analysis of their Systemhood.10
This idea is basic to the theory of Systems. It is why Systems theory is a 
study of dynamics—of behavior—rather than of primarily static features. For 
on the Systems view, behavior is not “external”—not simply an accident of 
circumstance; rather, behavior is characteristic; behavior is defining. Because 
the relations among entities within a System are fundamental to its System-
hood. This is an alternative conception of fundamentality—an alternative to 
the building-block conception of fundamentality.
One important point of clarification before we proceed further. Not every 
aggregation of entities is a System with a capital S. A true System is defined 
by a clear boundary between “inside” and “outside.” A boundary comes into 
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existence once there exists a critical mass of control that is exercised, within 
a given region, on a number of control variables. There is no space here to 
treat of the means by which this control is achieved (but see Thalos [2009]). 
Suffice it to say that when control is achieved within a space-time region, 
certain macro states of an aggregation of entities that comprise a System S 
will form a set of interconnected equilibrium conditions that can be adjusted 
directly by means of making alterations to a (characteristically macro) feature 
of S. Cybernetics, consequently, is the study of the properties of networks of 
interconnected equilibrium conditions. It comprises precise treatments of the 
performance of control apparatus, and features special attention to defective 
behavior that tends to bring about oscillations (from mild to violent) in control-
level quantities, when control apparatus is poorly designed, mishandled, 
diseased, infected by a foreign control apparatus, or generally overloaded.
Adoption of a System conception, then, lays the groundwork for a proposi-
tion to the effect that situated entities (entities in situ), in addition to potentially 
(though not invariably) retaining a certain amount of independence, may also 
coalesce, in the process forming molecular Systems that further interact in com-
plex ways with each other, as well as with and on the atoms that compose them.
This conception of a System renders the bond fundamental to an entity’s 
reality. Indeed it renders the bond itself an object to which fundamentality 
may attach. From a Systems perspective, bonding is the fundamental entity-
building process. In fact, from a Systems perspective, bonding is the most 
fundamental characteristic or feature of (nonatomic) objecthood. Objects 
spring into existence as a result of many (and overlapping) such bonds. 
Because, from the Systems perspective, an entity just is—it is fundamentally—
a thing bonded. It is just possible, on the Systems conception, that independent 
atoms exist, entities that possess no internal relations. And if it indeed is so, 
this would be a completely contingent fact. Where, by contrast, atomism 
simply assumes that it is a necessity.
Thus the contrast between atomism and systemism, as I shall call it, is the 
contrast, in ontology, between atoms (on the one hand) and situated entities 
(on the other). Situated entities are the subject of dynamical Systems theory, 
that brainchild of engineering science. From a Systems perspective, it is just 
as likely that there are internal relations “all the way down” as that there is a 
“ground” over which everything is constructed. Systemism is compatible 
both with atomism and with infinite descent. It is an alternative construal of 
what fundamentality itself consists in.
Another way to put this basic axiom of Systems theory is to say that the 
defining trait of a System is that it is a unit of aggregation. To appreciate this 
idea, it helps to bring to mind the engineering milieu from which it arises. 
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Dynamical systems theory is nowadays ubiquitous. From engineering (its 
point of origin and natural home), to physiology, and from psychology to 
ecology, it enjoys surprisingly wide application. Sometimes the analysis 
rings decisively false—as, for example, when adopted in certain treatments 
of historical narrative;11 other times it is provocative and controversial, 
as when applied to the phenomena of mind and cognition.12 Dynamical sys-
tems analysis (or “Systems Theory” with a capital “S”) is a strategy of 
analysis whose defining feature is its rejection of atomism. It mobilizes the 
language and mathematical technology of differential equations, and brings 
into play the distinctive concepts of equilibrium and attractor, as well as 
gain, coupling, and neighborhood, that are not obviously proprietary to any 
particular domain of objects or regime in the world.13 It is the ecumenical 
language of engineers, universal in scope. The unrestrictedness of the scope 
of Systems theory—the fact that it ranges over every scale of measurement—
is key to understanding its founding ideas. It thus must apply as aptly to the 
social sphere as to the nanosphere.
The defining characteristic of a System in the engineering context is simply 
that it is a real-time construction built by a process—and so is subject to being 
added onto in the same manner. A System is essentially an integrated thing—
a thing whose elements are integrated through organizational structures. 
Thus, whereas atomism adopts the point of view that wholes are aggregates, 
and thus not basic or fundamental, systemism adopts the contrasting view 
that some wholes are integrates, and that for these wholes their confed-
eration is basic to them and thus fundamental. This is, ultimately, the core 
contrast to which the entirety of this article is dedicated to illuminating.
Systemhood is thus a phenomenon of integration; it is thus a phenomenon 
of scale. And by this, I mean that systemhood is that phenomenon on which 
the very fact of multiple scales is possible. Systemization, in the sense just 
defined, is the realizations of capacities for bonding, and thus for further up-
scaling. Bonding is a System’s elemental or fundamental characteristic. The 
fundament of a System is not a ground or building block; it is a bond. A System 
is a One that is made out of many.
Herbert Simon (1973), decades ago, made remarks suggestive of this con-
ception of systemhood. He thought that certain features of certain systems 
could not be captured correctly by analysis of their parts taken together with 
the specific and heterogeneously conceived interactions among them. His idea 
derives from his concern with building systems. The idea is that to build a 
complex system (as nature does), one proceeds in stages, with the result that 
at the end of each stage, what is constructed must possess a stable structure (so 
as to “hold still” whilst the next phase of operations is being launched). 
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Without these intervals or layers of stability, complexity (according to Simon) 
is unsustainable. This makes complex systems typically: (a) modular; (b) inter-
substitutive in their parts; (c) qualitatively similar with a change to their parts 
or their number; and (d) stable under reaggregations of parts.14 Simon thus 
grasped for the idea that a System as such has to be governed by high-order 
structures of stability (something that might reasonably be referred to as its 
internal relations) that are relatively independent of the sorts of interactions 
(physiological, chemical, mechanical, or what-have-you) that govern pro-
ceedings among their parts more locally. Relations of stability can be realized 
by any of such proceedings, or combinations of them; but their true signifi-
cance is as relations of stability. A true System (with a capital S) is something 
special indeed, and subject to high-order relations among its constituents. 
A system that does not obey such laws is one that very soon falls apart; it is no 
true System. This amounts to saying that a System, with a capital S, is one in 
which the aggregation of the parts has undergone a reduction in degrees of 
freedom.15 An illustration of how this happens is worth extended scrutiny.
Many biological systems, on an ecological scale, fall squarely and unapol-
ogetically within the scope of a Systems analysis. Consider the flocking of 
birds. Dynamicists have only recently developed the idea that the remarkable 
synchrony of motion among flocking species can be explained by simple 
local adjustments to motion (“rules of flocking”), mediated through sensory 
modalities such as vision, sound, pressure, or odor detection. Assuming that 
each organism in a flock can sense local flockmates as well as its environ-
ment, and adjusts its own motion on an ongoing basis, Craig Reynolds (1987) 
devised a computational model of flocking “boids” based on the following 
“rules of engagement”:
1. Separation: steer to avoid crowding local flockmates in your “near 
neighborhood”;
2. Alignment: steer toward the average heading of local flockmates;
3. Cohesion: steer to move toward the average position of local 
flockmates.
In effect, flocking requires uniformly of each flock member only that it 
reacts to flockmates within a certain small neighborhood around itself, 
characterized by a distance and an angle (measured from the organism’s own 
vector of motion). Flockmates outside this local neighborhood can be 
ignored. Similar models have been devised to model the collective foraging 
behaviors of social insects; for example, ants in an ant colony.
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Specifics of the large-scale features of the synchronized motion matter a 
great deal—because flocking needs to be very fine-tuned if it is to serve the 
interests of the flock. These are, effectively, the internal relations that make the 
mates together function as a single, unified flock. So how, precisely, does fine 
tuning of the “rules of engagement” scale to produce the collective properties 
of the larger motion? For example, how does adjustment of the size of the 
neighborhood affect sensitivity to environmental features? How does it serve 
in location of food and avoidance or predators? The answer might surprise: 
much depends on the precise specifics of the flock’s “rules,” and not at all on 
any feature of any given organism in the flock. The “rules” concern “all-over” 
characteristics, which might well be shared with flocks of very different spe-
cies, and may in no way depend on the biology of the species. They are indeed 
internal relations, and not correlated with the characteristics of the atoms 
themselves. And they are, additionally, how a flock of N birds reduces its degrees 
of freedom when—and only when—they take to the air in their numbers.
We can illustrate this reduction in the context of our present flocking 
example. Close behavioral coupling among near neighbors in a flock allows a 
localized change in direction to be amplified and propagated across the flock. 
This allows each flock member to influence and be influenced by flockmates 
much farther away than their local neighborhood—it gives each a much larger 
“effective perceptual range” than their actual sensory range. Study of the 
details of the scaling relations reveals that it is hard for groups to maintain 
cohesion if the coupling distance is too short. Longer-range transfer of infor-
mation is enabled by increasing the coupling distance. Increasing the coupling 
distance further still creates a cohesive group, but then “misinformation” can 
be more easily propagated, so the flock becomes more susceptible to irrelevant 
fluctuations or falsely interpreted signals. In contexts in which high sensitivity 
to motions of distant flockmates is unnecessary, because (for instance) speed 
of response is not critical, its implementation becomes inadvisable, since it 
exposes the flock to unnecessary or undesirable sensitivity to signal.
In the event that coupling can be moderated by context, this is a highly desir-
able flock characteristic. For example, if individual boids in flight can condition 
their reactions on context (under threat, for example, aligning more strongly 
with distant flockmates, increasing “system gain”), this could allow for some 
flexibility in response time. Of course this is an evolutionary challenge.
What becomes more and more clear as dynamical analysis of flocking pro-
ceeds in this fashion, is that a flock of hundreds of organisms, operating under 
a set of “rules of engagement” is decidedly not a system with degrees of free-
dom on the order of hundreds: it is instead a system with something on the 
16  Philosophy of the Social Sciences XX(X)
order of a dozen degrees, counting among them rough size, coupling distance, 
and level of context-sensitivity, as well as environmental variables that tend to 
couple with these features. From a flocking perspective, a flock is an entity 
with a reduced number of degrees of freedom than there would be without the 
rules. Some of these degrees lie in the environment itself! These degrees of 
freedom displace many or most of the “micro” variables that predominate—
that are fundamental—when the boids are not flocking, as soon as the flock 
members begin governing themselves by the rules of engagement. This exam-
ple thus illustrates the point that fundamentality is a different matter entirely 
within a Systems treatment.
Displacement, Not Reduction
From a Systems perspective, what transpires from one scale to the next when 
new features appear and others move to the wings, is just that—displacement. 
Reduction, in the contemporary physicist’s sense (which, recall, harks back to 
the Carnap’s conceptualistic ambitions), is inapt. Nothing is eliminated. Cou-
pling distance simply appears as relevant, and subsequently—so long as the 
System persists as a System—dominates over features of the flock that would 
be more appropriate outside the flocking context. But coupling distance is 
never “reduced” to anything more “basic.” Purportedly “more basic” features 
(i.e., birds and their individual locations, as such) are simply sidelined. They 
do not disappear; but neither are they relevant for the purposes of the flock 
and its life. When the birds form a flock—when we have a System of boids—
coupling distance is a factor not to be ignored when explaining what transpires. 
Purportedly “more basic” features of the birds as such are irrelevant to flock-
ing rules. They are simply ignored. Their relevance is recovered when the 
birds are literally “on the ground”; there, coupling distance is not needed to 
explain their behavior. The boids are simply birds then. And that is that. That 
is how Systems analysis proceeds.
This fact reveals something about Systems as such. Systems come into exis-
tence full with bonds, and they de-Systematize when these bonds dissolve—as 
many Systems (like flocks) are very much apt to do. Reductions in degrees of 
freedom is key to the process—it is indeed the key metaphysic by which Sys-
tems are built. (“Metaphysic” is the better term, for the name of “process” does 
not capture the correct level of abstraction.) And these reductions are by no 
means the reductions spoken of by atomists. These reductions are true reduc-
tions in complexity, a topic to which we shall return by way of concluding.
Thus what is fundamental to Systemhood is the bond. In strong numbers, 
bonds in situ can effect reductions in degrees of freedom. A sufficiency of 
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reductions in degrees of freedom is key to the (manifest) granulation of things 
into “level-specific” natural kinds. An aggregation of entities is not a System 
if no such reductions take place. To be eligible of Systems analysis proper, a 
configuration of entities must be more than a mere aggregation. And a “level” 
is nothing if not yet one more occasion for a new application of Systems 
analysis. Levels are constructed by the iteration of internal relations.
Systemism Elsewhere
Use of the term systemism is not original with me. Mario Bunge is its origina-
tor. He first utilized it (in the 1960s) in the process of articulation of a middle 
ground between methodological individualism, on one side of the debate in the 
philosophy of social science, and holism, on the other. The concept was revived 
in the 1990s in the context of a renewed discussion of so-called “mechanism,” 
which has been taken up widely since. The “new mechanism” appears in the 
philosophy of biology (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Craver, 2001; Machamer, 
Darden, & Craver, 2000) as well as once more in the philosophy of social sci-
ence (Elster, 1989; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998; and Little, 1998).
Bunge receives some credit for the notion of systemism,16 but it is clear 
that those giving credit do not believe that Bunge’s articulation makes it clear 
how systemism is any kind of clear middle ground between two poles. Keith 
Sawyer (2001, 2002), while tipping the hat to Bunge, puts forward his own 
articulation of this same would-be middle ground, in terms of the notions of 
supervenience, multiple realization and emergence. Now my articulation of 
the term “systemism” is different from Bunge’s—and Sawyer’s too, into the 
bargain—although I do believe it is what Bunge intended. Let me explain.
Early Bunge (1979) maintained that a system consists of an ordered set 
(therefore, an abstract object) of (1) the component entities; and (2) the set of 
relations in which they stand. Crucially, this definition of a system does not 
define an object with properties in a class distinct from those that character-
ize component objects. This characterization also skirts entirely the issue of 
whether the relations are internal or external, and so does not (as Richard 
Langlois was quite right to point out) provide an intermediate point between 
holism and individualism. True: a serious holist would find it objectionable; 
but “What is not true is that systemism somehow represents a new method-
ological alternative: the basic ideas of what Bunge calls systemism are 
essentially identical to what sophisticated methodological individualists have 
believed all along” (Langlois 1983, 586).
In the 1990s, Bunge began to speak the language of mechanism and pro-
cess. And most recently (Bunge 2004, 188), he has arrived at the following: 
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“a system is a complex object whose parts or components are held together 
by bonds of some kind.” He is thus now tending in the direction of “internal 
relations,” though he has some way to go.
Now my approach, like Bunge’s most recent efforts, is fundamentally onto-
logical, nonabstract, and does not speak of theories, the laws at which they 
gesture, or how we come to learn them. And, unlike Sawyer’s, my approach 
does not rely on a ready-made (but seriously flawed) metaphysical doctrine, 
such as supervenience.17 Rather, and again like Bunge’s, it seeks to articulate 
principles that ground dynamical Systems analysis and the ways engineers 
especially apply it to real-world Systems.
Finally, my articulation of systemism really is a middle ground between 
atomism and holism. For it has three properties: (1) it rejects atomism; (2) it 
does not ignore the (material) entities and relations that hold them together in 
a System, allowing them to interact with one another and with the System’s 
more macro features; and (3) it speaks of the bonds that hold parts together as 
themselves fundamental, indeed as internal. And, despite (1)-(3), it falls shy 
of two objectionable (or at any rate objected-to) features of holism: (1) it does 
not define the parts in terms of the whole or its “functions,” so that parts do 
have an ontological reality independent of the whole; (2) it clearly acknowl-
edges the difference between simple aggregates and true integrates—only the 
latter of which are true Systems.
So whereas functionalism/holism might “seek to describe, to understand 
and in most cases to explain the orderliness and stability of entire social 
systems . . . [and in so far as it treats] individuals, the treatment comes after 
and emerges from analysis of the system as a whole” (Barnes 1995, 37), 
complete with characteristic “functions” such as the production of goods and 
services, systemism makes no such sweeping assumptions. Instead, system-
ism requires justification of each and every application of a Systems analysis 
to a set of social institutions (requiring demonstration of the propriety of 
employment of its defining concepts—the notion of boundary, for instance).18 
For it recognizes that some aggregates are not integrates in the relevant sense. 
And it recognizes too that even integrates do not enjoy “functions” in any 
defining or proprietary manner. So, to the extent that Durkheim and any soci-
ologist under his influence fails to recognize these points, they are not 
systemists proper. They fail to apply Systems theory conscientiously.
Different Theoretical Linkages
Systemism as articulated here—namely, as a construal of fundamentality that 
contrasts and competes with the building-block construal—has rather different 
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resonations from those of atomism. It is linked with an entirely different range 
of theoretical issues. For systemism is intimately and uniquely positioned to 
draw into its conceptual orbit, and within the parameters of scientific meta-
physics, the very notions of definition or essence, and so of discipline-specific 
natural kind terms. These are rarely called on these days to play key roles 
in organization of the special sciences, however eligible they present 
themselves for the job. (Nowadays “levels” are specified with reference to 
disciplines—for example, the “physical level” or the “biological level.” 
Levels are in this way dependent, at least for definition, on the administrative 
units typically found in universities—hardly inspiring as “fundamental” cat-
egories.) But when natural kinds are brought into view, as they naturally can 
be now in the light of our articulation of systemism, as in some way fundamen-
tal, they are within range of playing a role in the founding of disciplines or 
their scope. Key questions in the philosophy of natural kinds, if drawn into the 
orbit of fundamentality, will become more lively. Here are a few examples.
Once the questions concerning internal relations are posed as key to explo-
rations of (at least some) questions of fundamentality, and it comes clear that 
the defining question on the topic is not “Is there a fundamental level?” but 
rather “Are there internal relations?”, the link to certain core questions in the 
philosophy of science will be open to engagement in a new way. Because 
atomism is now the reigning view of fundamentality, the reigning view on the 
subject of nature is that there are no fundamental natural kinds outside of 
physics. Consequently, there immediately arise questions as to the true auton-
omy of nonphysical sciences. Now, I have sought here only to establish a 
competing conception of fundamentality, and not to argue for the fundamen-
tality of any specific kind, entity, or feature as fundamental under the new 
conception. This is the space that must now be mapped if we are to establish 
the autonomy of any nonphysical science, including of course psychology and 
sociology. But it becomes clear that there are important links to be forged—or 
refused—between conceptions of fundamentality and those that treat of the 
autonomy of different sciences.
Now, a critic of systemism as a construal of fundamentality might inquire 
as follows: Why suppose that the core question to which systemism is one 
answer (the question whether there are internal relations) is really a question 
about fundamentality at all? Why isn’t it an entirely orthogonal question? Of 
course this query takes us to the very heart of concern for fundamentality in 
the final reckoning. What work does the notion of “fundamental” do in a 
conceptual economy?
But the proponent of systemism as a legitimate construal of fundamentality 
seems to have available a straightforward reply to this question: because 
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systemism is concerned with internal relations, it is core to a methodology for 
examining whether there are order-establishing entities that are not them-
selves atoms, but rather bonds or unifiers—adhesive, not substance. The 
question of internal relations pertains to the foundations of order. And this 
makes the question to which systemism is an answer worthy of the name of 
“fundamentality” simply on the basis that the concept of “founding” con-
cerns orders of existents as to kind, for the purposes of knowledge regarding 
the order amongst things. It thus concerns the possibility of the origins of a 
One out of the many, where this is to be construed as pertinent to the organi-
zation of knowledge—to the organization of the sciences. Indeed, the very 
notion of “level” might itself suggest this, were it not for the dogma that often 
comes with the introduction of levels—to the effect that there is a hierarchy, 
and that the higher an entity’s position in this hierarchy, the more derivative 
(and hence nonfundamental) it is. Systemism presents a key challenge to the 
dogma that presently links scale, hierarchy, and derivativeness.
Answering the question of whether in fact there are natural kinds outside 
of physics is not itself an object of this article. The object is instead to notice 
that the questions regarding natural kinds resonate intimately with certain 
questions concerning fundamentality construed in the way here articulated, 
because these questions are both intimately linked to issues concerning the 
difference between internal and external relations. There are many issues to 
explore in addressing these matters that we cannot enter into in this small 
space—such as (in no particular order):
(1) When a new sphere of order (if multiple such there be) is founded, 
are there other things, in addition to internal relations, that do the 
founding? Laws of nature, perhaps? If laws are required too, are 
they more fundamental still than the internal relations?
(2) Do internal relations found other things in the new sphere of order 
(if such there be)?
(3) How are internal relations (if there are any) related to (and different 
from) external relations, in the language of natural kinds?
(4) How are internal relations (if there are any) related to the “laws” of 
the new order (if these exist)? Are internal relations differentially 
related to the “laws”?
(5) Is there more than one set of possible internal relations for any 
fixed set of aggregants? What happens in such cases? Do the aggre-
gants exercise any freedom in choosing the regime which shall 




It has been said that we need Systems analysis because the world is com-
plicated. Because there are far more “basic” entities, more bodies, more 
particles, and hence more quantities than a mathematical model founded 
on “fundamental” physical laws can handle. Moreover, things are sup-
posed to get many orders of magnitude more messy as we broaden the scope 
of concern to topics outside of physics. The necessity for a less fastidious 
manner of analysis is a matter of practicality—an “applied” rather than a 
theoretical matter—not a matter of principle. Systems analysis is thus, 
according to this idea, a concession to human frailties (for instance: Teller 
[1992]). And we stoop to Systems analysis—where we do—because it is 
a simple and incontestable fact of life that only superhuman intellect or 
yet-unattained mathematical facility can handle the computational complexi-
ties we face when we attempt to treat in theory the many-entity systems we 
must navigate in real life. Complexity is, on this conception of things that is 
characteristically pragmatic, an occasion for being practical—for yielding to 
a lesser form of analysis.
If our discussion on the topic of fundamentality is right, however, this 
point must be repelled. For if our discussion is correct, then Systems analysis 
offers a competing analysis of complexity itself, as well as a competing analy-
sis of fundamentality. If our discussion is correct, we must reply to Systems 
detractors as follows: we need Systems, not because the world is so complex 
(though it is frequently complex), but rather in spite of the purported com-
plexity. For Systems does not oversimplify what is genuinely complex. Rather, 
as we have seen here, Systems analysis is capable of taking advantage, in an 
elegant way, of certain serendipitous reductions in that complexity. For if sys-
temism is true, then we must amend the atomist’s conception of the world in 
the following way: in addition to possessing structure at smallest scales, the 
world possesses fundamental structure also at higher scales: our world is pos-
sessed of layers of emergent order. And this is the order that Systems analysis 
is designed to capture. Systems analysis gives us a general, recursive analysis—
that is to say, a meta-analysis—of how order at the next scale is structured, in 
neutral dynamical/metaphysical (not special-scientific) terms. Systems analy-
sis is thus the metaphysics of higher order. And it rests on an alternative 
conception of both fundamentality and complexity.
Consequently to the critic of systemism we are bound to reply: we require 
Systems analysis because there is more order—and correspondingly less 
complexity—in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in the philosophy of 
atomism. Such a metaphysical platform of fundamentality is a more firm 
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foundation than we have had to date for a theory of science that aims to 
accommodate each special science as autonomous.19
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Notes
 1. This overreaching statement is hard to take seriously: after all, such a theory will 
shed no light whatever on, for example, the biological.
 2. Bealer (n.d.) gives a penetrating treatment of the relationship between these ideas, 
while the tension between the reductionistic and nonreductionistic ideals 
among philosophers concerned with the unity of science is brought out nicely in 
Cat (2009).
 3. Van Inwagen (1990) resists the “reality” of these layers, but he is an outlier.
 4. The standard way of conceiving the relationship is to say that “laws” framed 
using the key concepts in one (higher-scale) domain do not yield to efforts to 
“reduce” them to laws framed using key concepts in another (lower-scale) 
domain, thus the key concepts of the higher-scale refer to causally autonomous 
features, and are ontologically fundamental. I do not endorse this view of the 
relationship between epistemic and ontological fundamentality, but nothing 
I shall say here depends on taking a position on the matter.
 5. One might complain here that relations have been traditionally construed as 
supervening on the entities they relate, and hence that any time “parts” are in 
evidence, there are at least two orders or levels of entities. Hence the distinction 
between internal and external is problematic. The obvious reply to this complaint 
is that the conception of supervenience is itself the problem, and that leaving the 
nature of relations open to inquiry is the right way to proceed in the debate. We 
shall discuss the nature of relations here by and by.
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 6. Patrick McGivern (2008) makes a nice contribution to this small literature.
 7. And under its influence, Anscombian and Davidsonian theories of action are 
similarly wedded to an untenable set of tenets regarding action and agency. For 
details on this see Thalos (2007). Thalos (2008b) is an instance of taking seri-
ously the possibility of molecular agency.
 8. More on these sorts of taxonomies can be found in Thalos (2008a). Individuals in 
Gemeinschaften, according to Tönnies, are regulated by shared norms that dictate 
the appropriate behavior and responsibilities of members of the association, to 
each other and to the association at large (there is a “unity of the will”; Tönnies 
1957 [1887], 22). Gemeinschaften are broadly characterized by a moderate 
division of labor, strong personal and family ties, racial and ethnic homogeneity, 
and relatively simple organizational structures. In such associations, because there 
is a strong collective sense of loyalty and belonging, codes of conduct require 
little or no external enforcement. Gesellschaften, by contrast, lack shared norms 
of conduct and are maintained instead by individual self interest. They are asso-
ciations in which, for the individual, the larger association never takes on more 
importance than individual self interest. A modern business is alleged to be a good 
example of Gesellschaften, where the workers, managers, and owners may share 
very little by way of concerns, beliefs, and motivations. Unlike Gemeinschaften, 
Gesellschaften emphasize secondary relationships rather than familial or com-
munity ties, and there is generally less individual loyalty to the association as such. 
Social cohesion in Gesellschaften presumably derives from the glue of an elabo-
rate division of labor, which results in a profound and typically insurmountable 
material dependency of individuals on one another and the system of organizations 
under which their labor is coordinated.
 9. The topic of social cohesion has been neglected since Collingwood’s time. And 
its measurement not performed until quite recently. Rajulton, Ravanera, and 
Beaujot (2007) have broken ground in this area by articulating a measure of social 
cohesion in terms of a combination of aggregated behavioral measures covering 
political (voting and volunteering), economic (occupation, income, labor force par-
ticipation), and social (social interactions, informal volunteering) measures.
10. Consequently, it will not always be possible to apply a standard causal path 
analysis to the interior workings of a System proper, since this analysis always 
assumes the probabilistic independence of contributions from different entities and 
factors—a Markov condition on them. The description of internal relations in 
the text paragraph defies the Markov condition. For more on this see Thalos 
(2009) and cf. Hitchcock (2008).
11. See, for example, the reaction of Roth and Ryckman (1995).
12. See books with such titles as Stairway to the Mind (Alwyn 1995) and Thinking 
in Complexity: The Complex Dynamics of Matter, Mind and Mankind (Mainzer 
1994), and Chaos, Creativity, and Cosmic Consciousness (Sheldrake, McKenna, 
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and Abraham 2001). There are less ambitious treatments, but nonetheless in the 
same spirit: for example, Bedeau (1997).
13. Good introductions to the concepts and language of Systems analysis: Abraham 
(1992) and Broer and Takens (1992). Philosophical discussions of the founda-
tions of Systems analysis can be found in Thalos (2009) and Thalos (2006); cf. 
the entire December 2007 (vol. 37, no. 4) issue of this journal.
14. Wimsatt (1976, 2006, 2007) makes reference to many of these conditions as well 
in describing the difference between aggregates (on the one hand) and composed 
or evolved Systems (on the other); and Bechtel and Richardson (1992) illustrate 
the ways in which scientific methodologies attain what they refer to as emergent 
phenomena utilizing these criteria.
15. I have articulated this point more at greater length in terms of the technically 
defined notion of degree of freedom in Thalos (2006) and Thalos (2009).
16. Two special issues of the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2004, nos. 
2 and 3) were dedicated to Bunge’s contributions to the social sciences by way 
of his defense of that general idea.
17. It is nowise my intention to repeat the charges against supervenience here. For 
review of the issues, see McLaughlin and Bennett (2008). My own complaints 
are lodged in a series of articles, most importantly Thalos (2006).
18. That it must do so is spelled out in Thalos (2009).
19. The imperative of autonomy for the so-called “special sciences”, as well as its 
prospects, are taken up in Thalos (n.d.).
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